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ABSTRACT
Research to date on accounting for stock options has focused the analysis on a single group
of corporate stakeholders, stockholders.  This paper reports the results of a survey administered to
another group of stakeholders, creditors.  Commercial bankers were surveyed regarding the
accounting treatment for stock options and the perceived impact of stock options on financial
statements, firm valuation, and the loan decision.  A unique aspect of our study is that we surveyed
bankers during two distinct periods.  We first surveyed bankers in 1999, well after the debate
surrounding SFAS 123 (FASB, 1995), but before the resurgence of the debate leading up to SFAS
123(R) (FASB, 2004).  We surveyed again in 2005, as companies were implementing SFAS 123(R).
This allows us to comment on the impact of public debate preceding the rule revision on the
perceptions of a group of well-informed financial statement users.
We find bankers in both periods view stock options as compensation. The method of
accounting does not matter if relevant information is disclosed. More experienced loan officers from
1999, and those who deal with stock options frequently from 2005, are less negative than others
about the impact of stock options on shareholder interest in company assets. 
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago employee stock options accounted for approximately 7% of total shares
outstanding; today this percentage is nearly double, and in high-tech industries option grants
typically constitute a quarter of shares outstanding.  Further, in 1982, Directors  & Board conducted
a roundtable of 20 top executives on whether a chief executive was worth $1 million in annual
compensation (only a few CEOs had broken the barrier).  Two decades later, the vast majority of
chief executives receive at least $1 million, with some receiving much more.  During the 1990’s, the
combination of generous options grants and a raging bull market created huge paydays for the
nation’s executives (Rock, 1998).
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Most research to date on accounting for stock options has been capital markets-based.  There
are no research results focusing on other stakeholders' perceptions of the information content of
GAAP disclosures.  The objective of this paper is to report the results of a survey designed to elicit
responses from commercial bankers regarding the accounting treatment for stock options and the
perceived impact of stock options on the financial statements and firm valuation.
A unique aspect of our study is that we conducted the survey during two distinct time
periods.  The first survey was conducted in 1999, well after the debate surrounding SFAS 123
(FASB, 1995), but before the resurgence of the debate leading up to SFAS 123(R) (FASB, 2004).
Our second survey was conducted in 2005, as companies were implementing SFAS 123(R). Survey
participants in both groups are remarkably similar as to their years of lending experience, familiarity
with employee stock options and the frequency in which they review financial statements of
companies that issue stock options. This allows us to comment on the potential impact of the public
debate leading to the rule revision on the perceptions of a group of reasonably well-informed
financial statement users. We also employ two scenarios, one of a publicly traded company and one
of a privately held company, in both surveys.
We find bankers in both periods believe that stock option distributions represent
compensation to the recipients, in both scenarios, although fewer respondents believe that the stock
options of a private company represent compensation. Participants in both surveys also report that
the method of accounting does not matter if relevant information is disclosed. Overall, survey
participants respond that shareholders’ interest in the company’s assets has decreased as a result of
the distribution of stock options. More experienced loan officers from 1999, and those who deal with
stock options frequently from 2005, are less negative than others about the impact of stock options
on shareholder interest in company assets.
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section presents the accounting rules for
stock options.  In the third section, prior research on the information content of stock options is
presented.  The research methodology is presented in the fourth section, followed by the results in
the fifth section.  Finally, the conclusions are provided.
ACCOUNTING RULES FOR STOCK OPTIONS 
Before the issuance of SFAS No. 123, APB Opinion No. 25 dictated that the accounting for
stock options use the intrinsic-value method.  Under this method, value is measured as the difference
between the stock price and the exercise price on the date of the grant.  Hence, compensation
expense is the excess of the market price of the stock over the option price on the measurement date.
The measurement date is the date both the number of shares to be issued and the option price are
known to the firm.  This is normally the grant date (these types of plans are known as fixed stock
options).  If the option price equals or exceeds the market price on the measurement date, no
compensation expense results.  Frequently, the option’s exercise price is set equal to the current
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stock price, so the options are deemed to have a zero value, and no compensation expense is
recorded (Williams, 1995).  
Between 1985 and 1988, the FASB conducted research into the applicability of various stock
option pricing models for employee stock option plans.  However, in 1988, the FASB tabled the
stock options project.  In early 1991, the business press created a public controversy over excessive
executive compensation.  Senator Carl Levin introduced a bill calling for the SEC to require
corporations to reduce their earnings by the estimated present value of all stock options granted to
its executives.  In response to public interest in executive compensation, the FASB, in 1992, voted
to revive the stock option accounting project (Fraser, et al. 1998).
In 1993, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft, “Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation.”
The exposure draft proposed new requirements for measuring and reporting expenses related to
employee stock option plans.  The exposure draft required firms to determine compensation expense
based on the fair value of the stock option plan at the date of grant.  The impetus for the FASB’s
need to change the way in which stock options were accounted for was best expressed by FASB
Vice-Chairman James J. Leisenring in hearings before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Subcommittee on Securities.  Leisenring told subcommittee members that, under APB No.
25, transactions with substantially the same economic effects often received drastically different
accounting treatments.  He said that a change in the way in which stock options are accounted for
was necessary because existing standards were biased and lacked credibility.  Thus, the exposure
draft was designed to require companies to account for stock options in the same manner (Rouse and
Barton, 1993).
The FASB experienced tremendous opposition from politicians, businesses and CPAs to the
exposure draft because companies no longer could give important executive officers compensation
without recording an expense.  The greatest opposition to the standard focused on such issues as (1)
its negative impact on net income, (2) the fact that net equity would be unaffected, (3) dilution
already is reflected in earnings per share, (4) the costs of implementing the standard are greater than
the benefits (Rouse and Barton, 1993), (5) the standard may impose competitive disadvantages on
some firms (especially high technology and start up firms), (6) the inability of firms to measure the
compensation well enough to include it as an expense in the income statement, and (7) new motives
may emerge for executives to make sub-optimal decisions based on accounting rather than economic
consideration (Fraser, et al. 1998).
Leisenring argued that with the exception of fixed employee stock options, all transactions
in which equity instruments are issued are recognized in the financial statements.  Moreover, all
other forms of compensation, including salaries, pensions, restricted stock, and health care benefits
are measured and recognized as costs in financial statements. Thus, the proposed standard would
level the playing field.  The FASB disputed the measurement argument on the grounds that
companies already used several measurements in accounting that were much more difficult than the
one called for in the accounting for stock options (Rouse and Barton, 1993).
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In spite of the above arguments made by the FASB in support of its proposed accounting for
stock options, it could not convince opponents to support the notion of requiring expense
recognition.  Thus, in mid-1994 the FASB announced it would not require 1994 financial statements
to show a valuation for options granted that year.  Further, on October 23, 1995, the FASB issued
SFAS No.123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation.  The standard encouraged firms to
recognize the estimated cost of employee stock options as a charge to earnings but allowed the
alternative of disclosing the estimated cost in the footnotes and leaving the expense off the income
statement.
In 2002, following several major accounting scandals, many companies began to voluntarily
switch from the intrinsic value method to the fair value method.  In response to the concern of many
companies of the “ramp up” effect of the transition method stipulated in SFAS 123, the FASB issued
SFAS 148 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation – Transition and Disclosure.  Within the
statement, the FASB allowed additional transition methods and attempted to make the presentation
and disclosure of stock options more comparable across firms.  At this point, however, the fair value
method was “preferred,” but not required.
In 2003, members of Congress developed the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act.  It was
a direct challenge to FASB and an attempt to mandate how companies should account for share-
based compensation.  In the midst of the debate over this act, the FASB issued Statement no. 123(R)
in December, 2004.  SFAS 123(R) eliminated the intrinsic value method with pro-forma data in a
footnote as an acceptable disclosure method.  While the standard did not address several
controversial topics, such as acceptable valuation models, it required all companies to follow the fair
value method and accrue compensation expense at the issue date of the options (Eaton and Prusyk,
2005).  Our second survey was sent out shortly after the issuance of SFAS 123(R).
PRIOR RESEARCH
Dechow, et al., (1996) employed three research approaches to evaluate the nature and extent
of the predicted economic consequences of accounting for stock-based compensation.  First, they
examined the attributes of firms lobbying against the 1993 exposure draft.  Second, they examined
the attributes of firms using employee stock options under the original financial reporting rules.
Third, they examined stock price reactions to announcements concerning SFAS No. 123.  They
found that, controlling for size and industry, top executives of firms submitting comment letters
opposing mandatory expensing receive a greater proportion of their compensation from options,
receive higher levels of total compensation, and are at firms that use options relatively more
intensively for top-executive compensation than for other employees.  Further, they found no
systematic support for the assertions that expensing stock options would increase firms’ costs of
capital, and no evidence was found that investors reacted to news concerning expensing of stock
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options.  That is, the stock market did not act as if expensing stock options would have negative
economic consequences for high-growth firms making extensive use of employee stock options. 
Aboody (1996) also reported that the FASB’s method for recognizing compensation expense
would not increase (and may even reduce) the informativeness of reported earnings.  On the other
hand, Fraser et al (1998) reported results inconsistent with Dechow, et al. (1996) when they found
that the shareholder returns for large, well-established firms fell when the FASB stock option
proposal was announced and recovered when the proposal was withdrawn.  However, returns of
small start-up firms and firms that offer employer options to non-executives were unaffected by the
announcements.  Botosan and Plumlee (2001) found that the compensation expense, if reported
under the fair value method, would have a material impact on manager performance measures.  They
also predicted that stock option expense would increase over the next several years.  Balsam,
O’Keefe and Weidemer (2007) found that corporations were reducing their use of stock options in
favor of alternative forms of compensation because of manager’s concerns that the reporting
requirements under SFAS 123(R) would adversely affect stock price and hinder raising capital.
To date, the impact of stock option accounting and the associated public debate has focused
on implications to investors.  A fundamental objective of accounting information, however, is to
provide information useful to investors and creditors (SFAC No. 1, 1978).  Accounting research
studies on bankers’ perceptions have been limited.  For the most part they have focused on such
issues as new audit reports (Geiger 1994), accountant involvement in forecasts (Strawser 1994), the
effect of recognition versus disclosure of unfunded postretirement benefits on lenders’ perceptions
of debt (Harper, et al. 1991), the impact of pension disclosure rules on perceptions of debt (Harper,
et al. 1987) and non-GAAP financial statements (Baker 1990).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We study the perceptions of bankers to borrowers who issue stock options.  Specifically, we
are concerned with how bankers interpret the impact of stock options on the client and on their loan
decision. We are also concerned with bankers’ views of the importance of the disclosure method,
as that has been a major part of the public debate on the accounting for stock options.  Executive
level loan officers make an excellent pool from which to draw our sample, as they see financial
statements from several different types of companies and they are reasonably sophisticated financial
statement users.   
Data were collected from executive level loan officers using a scenario involving a company
issuing a series of options where the exercise price is equal to the market value of the stock on the
date of grant.  The first data set was collected in 1999; the second data set was collected in 2005,
following the passage of SFAS 123(R).  These samples allow us to examine not only bankers’
perceptions of stock options, but also how perceptions toward stock options were influenced by the
public debate surrounding stock options and the subsequent issuance of SFAS 123(R). 
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Subjects were told of the acceptable disclosure methods in effect at the time of the survey.
For the 1999 survey, this was based SFAS 123; for the 2005 survey, this was based on SFAS
123(R).  They were also told the major differences between the fair value method and the intrinsic
method of reporting.  We explained that under the intrinsic value method, the company must still
include a footnote disclosure of pro-forma net income and earnings per share data as if the fair value
had been used.
 We then asked the participant’s perceptions of the following. 
(Q1) Has the company provided compensation through the distributions? 
(Q2) Have the shareholders’ interests in the net assets of the company changed due to the
distributions? 
(Q3) What is the effect of the distributions on the company value? 
(Q4) What is the importance of the stock option distributions on making bank lending
decisions or evaluating compliance with loan covenants with respect to the
company? 
(Q5) Does the method of accounting for stock options matter if all relevant information
is disclosed in the footnotes?
The subjects were asked to answer the questions above assuming that a) the company is
publicly traded and b) the company is privately held and is expected to eventually be taken public.
Demographic questions were asked regarding: 
(D1) years of lending experience,
(D2)  familiarity with employee stock options,
(D3)  frequency in which a review is made of companies with employee stock option
plans,
The participants for the 1999 sample were randomly selected from the population of loan
officers included in The Thompson/Polk Bank Directory (also known as "The Bankers' Blue Book").
Every bank chartered in the US has an individual listing in the directory.  In order for a subject to
be included in the sample, the commercial lending officer must be employed by a US bank, and the
bank must not be a branch bank.  Holding companies and trust companies were also excluded.  The
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population after these deletions consisted of 8,843 chartered commercial banks.  In 2005,
participants were randomly selected from a list of 7,608 active commercial banks chartered in the
US which we downloaded from FDIC website (http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp).  The 2005
list also excluded holding companies and trust companies.
An original mailing and two follow-up mailings were sent to each of the subjects.  In order
to determine whether response bias was potentially problematic, respondents were separated into
early, middle and late categories in accordance with the three mailing dates.  Analysis of
demographics indicated no material differences across the three categories of respondents.
Table 1 reports data on the survey responses.  After eliminating bad addresses, we had a net
sample of 379 bankers in 1999 and 391 bankers in 2005.  We gave the bankers the option of not
participating in the survey, but requested information from them as to why.  Approximately half of
the 75 non-participants from the 1999 sample and approximately two-thirds of the non-participants
in the 2005 sample stated that they were not familiar with stock options.  This may have been the
result of the nature of the borrowers in the bankers’ portfolios.  This also allowed us to collect
information from only those bankers who believed they were familiar with the nature and purpose
of stock options.  Thus, the participants in the survey believe they are adequately informed
concerning the impact executive stock options may have on one of their borrowers.
We feel we have a reasonable response rate and participation rate for our analysis.  The
survey response rate (total responses/the net sample) is 31 percent for the 1999 survey and 35
percent for the 2005 survey.  Further, a little over one-third of the respondents believed they
possessed the technical knowledge necessary to determine how the issuance of executive stock
options affects their borrowers, how important that effect is to the loan decision, and how important
is the method of disclosure.  We had a participation rate (participant responses/total responses) of
36 percent in 1999 and 39 percent in 2005. 
Table 1 :  Survey Responses
1999 2005
Original sample   400   400
Undeliverable addresses    21     9
Net sample   379  391
Reasons given for Non-participation:
Bank policy     7   15
No corporate accounts     0     1
Not familiar with stock options   36   54
No reason given   22     0
Other reasons   10   13
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Total non-participant responses   75   83
Participant responses   43   52
Total responses 118 135
Survey response rate 
(total responses/net sample) 31% 35%
Survey participation rate
(participant responses/total responses) 36% 39%
Table 2 contains the demographics of the two samples.  The most experienced respondent
from each sample had 38 years of lending experience (D1); the least experienced in the 1999 sample
had one year of experience, while the least experienced in the 2005 sample had 2 years of
experience.  The median years of experience from the 1999 sample is 15 years, and the median years
of experience for the 2005 sample is 20 years.  Thus, the respondents are fairly experienced loan
officers, with the 2005 sample consisting of slightly more experienced subject than are in the 1999
sample.  Most respondents consider themselves somewhat familiar with stock options (D2).  The
median self-assessment score is 3 on a scale of 10 for each sample (with 10 being highly familiar),
however, as a group, the lenders do not view themselves as experts on the subject (the third quartile
is 4 and the maximum self-assessment is 6 for both samples).   This may be explained by the fact
that many of the subjects do not frequently review the financial statements of companies with
employee stock options (D3).   The median score on a 10-point scale (10 being very frequently) is
3 for the 1999 sample and 2 for the 2005 sample.  However, the maximum rating for both samples
is 10, indicating that some bankers frequently deal with borrowers that issue stock options.
Table 2:  Demographic Variables-Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: 1999 Data
Variable Name Max Q3 Med Q1 Min N SD
D1 Years of lending experience 38 20 15 10 1 42 9.1560
D2 Familiarity with employee
stock options (0 = no familiarity;
10 = highly familiar)
6 4 3 2 0 43 1.6971
D3 Frequency in which financial  
statements with employee
stock options are reviewed 
(0 = rarely; 10 = very frequently)
10 4 3 1 0 43 2.4382
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Panel B: 2005 Data
Variable Name Max Q3 Med Q1 Min N SD
D1 Years of lending experience 38 25 20 10 2 54 9.1090
D2 Familiarity with employee
stock options (0 = no familiarity;
10 = highly familiar)
6 4 3 2 0 53 1.5400
D3 Frequency in which financial
statements with employee
stock options are reviewed
 (0 = rarely; 10 = very frequently)
10 3 2 1 0 54 2.3506
From table 2, we can safely state that there are no major differences between the subjects of
the 1999 study and the subjects of the 2005 study in the three demographic characteristics evaluated.
This is important because our subsequent analysis discusses how the debate leading up to the
issuance of SFAS 123(R) may have influenced bankers’ perceptions of stock options.  While many
of the subjects did not view themselves as being highly familiar with stock options, as bankers they
clearly meet the description of reasonably sophisticated financial statement users.  Consequently,
their perceptions of the impact and reporting of stock options is of value to standard-setters.
RESULTS
Table 3 provides descriptive-level data on the responses of the 1999 and 2005 survey
participants to both scenarios: a publicly traded company (panel A), and a privately held company
(panel B).
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Responses for Publicly Traded Company 
Question Year Max Q3 Med Q1 Min N SD
Q1 Has the Company provided
compensation through stock option
distribution
 (Yes=1 No=-1)
1999 1 1 1 -1 -1 3 0.8830
2005 1 1 1 1 -1 50 0.7010
Q2 Has the shareholders' interest in
the assets of the Company changed
as a result of the distribution of the
stock options
(Increase = 1 No change = 0
Decrease = -1 
1999 1 0 -1 -1 -1 43 0.7336
2005 1 0 -1 -1 -1 53 0.6968
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Q3. What is the effect of the stock
distributions on Company value
(Highly unfavorable = -7 Highly
favorable =7)
1999 5 1 0 -1 -5 43 2.4036
2005 7 3 0 -2 -5 54 2.8927
Q4. How important would the stock
option distributions be in making
lending decisions or evaluating
compliance with loan covenants
(Very unimportant = 0 Very
important = 12)
1999 12 9 6 3 0 43 3.6184
2005 11 8 5 2 0 54 3.4935
Q5. Does the method of accounting
for stock options matter when all
relevant information is disclosed in
footnotes (Yes = 1 No = -1)
1999 1 1 -1 -1 -1 43 0.9983
2005 1 1 -1 -1 -1 51 0.9653
Panel B Responses for Privately Held Company 
Question Year Max Q3 Med Q1 Min N SD
Q1 Has the Company provided
compensation through stock 
option distribution 
(Yes=1 No=-1)
1999 1 1 1 -1 -1 42 1.0017
2005 1 1 1 0 -1 49 0.9476
Q2 Has the shareholders' interest in
the assets of the Company 
changed as a result of the
distribution of the stock options
(Increase = 1 No change = 0 
Decrease = -1)
1999 1 0 0 -1 -1 42 0.6922
2005 1 0 -1 -1 -1 50 0.6776
Q3. What is the effect of the stock
distributions on Company value 
(Highly unfavorable = -7 Highly
favorable =7)
1999 5 0 0 0 -3 42 1.8106
2005 9 2 0 -1 -5 51 2.7282
Q4. How important would the stock
option distributions  be in making
lending decisions or evaluating
compliance with loan covenants
(Very unimportant = 0 
Very important = 12)
1999 12 9 7 3 0 42 3.6308
2005 12 8 5 2 0 50 3.2950
Q5. Does the method of accounting
for stock options matter when all
relevant  information is disclosed in
footnotes 
(Yes = 1 No = -1)
1999 1 1 -1 -1 -1 43 0.9213
2005 1 1 -1 -1 -1 48 0.9528
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Panel A shows that for a publicly traded company, on average, commercial loan officers
from both samples believe that compensation is being provided through the distribution of stock
options (Q1) and that its distribution has caused shareholders’ interest in the assets of the company
to decrease (Q2).  On the other hand, respondents indicate that the distribution of the stock options
has no impact on company value (Q3), on average. 
The score for this question (Q3, regarding the impact on company value) for the third
quartile of respondents, especially in 2005, indicates that a portion of the sample feel that the
distribution of stock options has a positive impact on company value. It is possible that this group
of respondents is thinking of the incentive effects on the employees receiving the stock options, or
perhaps they feel that the company has been able to reduce cash outflows for compensation by
substituting stock options, thus increasing company value.  
Panel B shows that loan officers respond similarly to these questions when the scenario
involves a privately held company. In both Panel A and B, there appears to be a more diverse range
of opinion regarding the impact of stock options on company value (Q3) among the 2005 sample
than in 1999.  
The loan officers from both samples in both scenarios report that stock option distributions
are of some importance in making bank lending decisions or in the evaluation of loan covenants
compliance (Q4). (An alternative interpretation is that six represents the point of neutrality on a 12
point scale. No intermediate value labels were provided to participants, only the end-points of very
unimportant = 0 and very important = 12.) Finally, they are of the opinion that the method of
accounting for stock options does not matter if all relevant information is disclosed (Q5).
Table 4, panels A1 and B1, contain the correlations between the demographic variables and
the 1999 sample of bankers’ responses to questions for a publicly traded and privately held
company, respectively.  There is a significant negative relationship between lending experience (D1)
and the commercial bankers’ responses to questions regarding the impact of the stock option
distributions on shareholders’ interest in net assets (Q2) for both scenarios. There is also a
significant negative relationship between experience and the response on company value (Q3) for
publicly traded companies. Thus, the more experienced loan officers in the 1999 sample tend to find
that the impact of stock options on shareholders’ interest in net assets and on company value is
negative to a greater 
extent than do less experienced loan officers. 
There is also a significant negative relationship between the frequency with which bankers
review the financial statements of companies with employee stock options (D3) and the importance
they place on stock option distributions in making bank lending decisions or evaluating compliance
with loan covenants (Q4) under the privately held company scenario in panel  B1. This indicates that
the more frequently a banker reviews the financial statements of companies with employee stock
options, the less importance is attached to them in terms of making a loan decision or evaluating
loan compliance. 
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The correlations between the demographic variables and the questions for the 2005 sample
of bankers, shown in panels A2 and B2 of Table 4, are quite different than those from the 1999
sample. The loan officers’ experience (D1) is no longer a factor in their evaluation of the impact of
stock option distributions on shareholder interest (Q2) or company value (Q3), for either scenario.
This may indicate that the high level of publicity and controversy surrounding stock options in the
intervening years may have “leveled the playing field” between more- and less-experienced loan
officers. For the privately held company scenario only, panel B2, more experience (D1) correlates
significantly with the loan officers attaching less importance to a stock option distribution when
making the lending decision (Q4), while a less-experienced loan officer would attach more
importance to stock option distribution.  
We also find, in Panel A2 of Table 4, that frequency (D3) is positively correlated with the
impact of option distributions on the shareholders’ interest in assets (Q2).  Recall from Table 3 that
the average response among all loan officers was that stock option distribution decreases the
shareholders’ interests in the assets of the scenario company. We therefore interpret this correlation
in Table 4 to indicate that increased frequency of dealing with companies that issue stock options
is related to a less-negative view of the impact of option distributions on the shareholders’ interest
in assets.
The last correlation of note in Table 4 is between the experience of the loan officer (D1) and
the importance of stock distribution in making lending decisions or evaluating compliance with loan
covenants (Q4) in the privately held company scenario. We find that more experienced loan officers
place significantly less importance on stock option distributions than the overall average when
making such decisions or evaluations.
Table 4:  Correlation between Demographic Variables and Questions*
Question/Demographic Variable D1 D2 D3
Experience Familiarity Frequency
Panel A.1: Publicly Traded Company in 1999
Q1 Compensation
0.0878 0.0901 -0.1155
(0.58) (0.57) (0.46)
Q2 Shareholder interest
-0.5150 0.0001 0.1335
(0.00) (0.99) (0.39)
Q3 Company value
-0.3243 0.0521 0.2157
(0.04) (0.74) (0.16)
Q4 Importance
-0.1464 -0.1201 -0.1318
(0.36) (0.44) (0.40)
Q5 Accounting method
0.2339 0.1730 -0.0096
(0.14) (0.27) (0.95)
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Panel A.2: Publicly Traded Company in 2005
Q1 Compensation
0.0401 -0.1703 0.0388
(0.78) (0.24) (0.79)
Q2 Shareholder interest
0.0188 0.1671 0.2833
(0.89) (0.24) (0.04)
Q3 Company value
0.0357 0.2258 0.0980
(0.80) (0.11) (0.49)
Q4 Importance
-0.2392 -0.1969 -0.0992
(0.08) (0.16) (0.48)
Q5 Accounting method
-0.0696 0.0244 0.0901
(0.63) (0.87) (0.53)
Panel B.1: Privately Held Company in 1999
Q1 Compensation
0.1881 -0.1155 -0.2218
(0.24) (0.47) (0.16)
Q2 Shareholder interest
-0.3066 0.1032 0.2609
(0.05) (0.52) (0.10)
Q3 Company value
-0.2198 -0.0017 0.1993
(0.17) (0.99) (0.21)
Q4 Importance
-0.2508 -0.0759 -0.2986
(0.11) (0.63) (0.05)
Q5 Accounting method
0.2211 0.1088 -0.0759
(0.17) (0.50) (0.64)
Panel B.2: Privately Held Company in 2005
Q1 Compensation
-0.0973 -0.2009 0.1025
(0.51) (0.17) (0.48)
Q2 Shareholder interest
0.1223 0.0429 -0.0648
(0.40) (0.77) (0.66)
Q3 Company value
0.003 0.0184 0.0161
(0.98) (0.90) (0.91)
Q4 Importance
-0.3452 -0.1811 -0.0357
(0.01) (0.21) (0.81)
Q5 Accounting method
-0.1247 0.0220 0.0492
(0.40) (0.88) (0.74)
*Spearman correlation coefficients are presented (with p-values in parentheses)
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Table 5 contains the paired test of mean responses to the questions for public versus private
companies.  The results of the 1999 sample of bankers indicate that there is no significant difference
between the mean responses for a publicly traded company and a privately held company except for
two cases. The loan officers respond more positively to the question of whether stock options
represent compensation (Q1) for publicly traded companies than for privately held companies. Also,
although overall they respond negatively to the question of whether the method of accounting
matters (Q5), they are less negative for publicly traded companies. In other words, the method of
accounting matters more for publicly traded companies. 
Table 5:  Paired Test of Means (Public – Private)
1999 Survey
Variable Mean Standard Error t-statistic p-value
Q1 Compensation 0.19048 0.0702 2.71 0.01
Q2 Shareholder interest -0.0952 0.0747 -1.27 0.21
Q3 Company value -0.1667 0.3372 -0.49 0.62
Q4 Importance -0.0952 0.4115 -0.23 0.82
Q5 Accounting method 0.0976 0.0469 2.08 0.04
2005 Survey
Variable Mean Standard Error t-statistic p-value
Q1 Compensation 0.33333 0.10870 3.07 0.00
Q2 Shareholder interest -0.06000 0.07230 -0.83 0.41
Q3 Company value -0.07843 0.32160 -0.24 0.81
Q4 Importance -0.08000 0.34030 -0.24 0.82
Q5 Accounting method 0.00000 0.05950 0.01 0.99
A plausible reason as to why bankers respond differently to Q1 and Q5 across the two
scenarios is that while all stock options represent only potential value which is realized on sale or
exercise, stock options for privately held companies are also conditioned on the company actually
becoming publicly traded at some point in the future. It is possible that the 1999 sample of loan
officers are more interested in the method of accounting for stock options in the publicly traded
company scenario because they find stock options for privately held companies to be too speculative
and conditional on future events to be valued as compensation. 
The 2005 sample of bankers respond differently to the publicly traded and privately held
scenarios only for Q1, whether stock options represent compensation. Significantly more
participants report that stock option distributions represent compensation in the publicly-held
company scenario than for a privately held company. We see no difference across scenarios for the
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importance of accounting methods (Q5) in the 2005 sample, unlike the responses from the 1999
sample.  
We compare the average responses of the 1999 participants to those from 2005 in Table 6.
There are no significant differences between the means from the two samples in a pooled test
assuming equal variances in the two groups.  We find similar results when we assume unequal
variances. The question on which the difference between the two samples most closely approaches
significance is whether the distribution of stock options represents compensation (Q1), where it
appears possible that participants in 2005 would have answered slightly more positively that stock
options represent compensation than participants in 1999 if we had a larger sample and thus, more
power to find a significant difference.  However, for our sample, the effect is either too slight to
overcome the limitations in power due to sample size, or there is simply no statistical difference. 
Table 6:  Comparison of Survey Responses for Public Companies - t-test of Differences*
Variable
Pooled 
t-statistic p-value
Satterthwaite
t-statistic p-value
Q1 Compensation 1.41 (0.16) 1.39 (0.17)
Q2 Shareholder interest -0.46 (0.65) -0.46 (0.65)
Q3 Company value 0.37 (0.71) 0.38 (0.71)
Q4 Importance -1.24 (0.22) -1.23 (0.22)
Q5 Accounting method -0.65 (0.52) -0.65 (0.52)
*2005 responses – 1999 responses
We think it worth noting that despite the substantial controversy surrounding stock options
in both the public media and within accounting regulatory bodies during the years from 1999 to
2005, and the major revisions of accounting standards during that time, one group of financial
statement users, loan officers, experienced very little change of opinion regarding the impact of
stock options on the companies they evaluate.
CONCLUSION
We examine bankers’ perceptions of stock options.  On average, for a publicly traded
company, the results indicate that commercial loan officers believe that stock options are
compensation to those who receive them.  They are paid for by shareholders via a reduction in their
interest in company net assets. Further, the granting of stock options does not translate into a change
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in company value, which implies that the compensation represented by the stock options is for past
performance and is reflected in the company’s value.  
Respondents from both samples feel that the accounting method for stock options does not
matter if all relevant information is disclosed in the footnotes.  Perhaps there are several reasons why
they feel this way.  First, with adequate disclosure, bankers are provided with information necessary
to determine the cash flow effect(s) of stock options.  Second, given that disclosures in the footnotes
should adequately present all pertinent information regarding the stock options, financial statement
users can make their own determination of the impact of the stock options on their decision
variables.  On the other hand, those who are of the opinion that the method of accounting does
matter are probably concerned with such issues as consistency across all firms in terms of
determining compensation costs, and in the case of comparing companies, subjective and difficult
recalculations of earnings and company performance.
With respect to the privately held company, although respondents from both years, overall,
feel that compensation is being provided through the distribution of stock options, this belief is
significantly weaker than in the publicly traded company scenario. This response can be interpreted
as acknowledgement that a private company must go public before the stock options have value; an
event which may or may not happen.  According to both sets of participants, stock option
distributions have no impact on the shareholders’ interest in the assets of the company or company
value; however, the bankers surveyed in 2005 feel that stock options, even for a privately-held
company, are paid for by shareholders.  Bankers feel that the accounting method employed to
account for stock options for a privately held company does not matter if all relevant information
is disclosed.  
For both publicly traded and privately held companies, our findings are consistent with
Dechow, et al. and Aboody with regard to finding no support for the assertions that expensing stock
options increases the cost of capital, because bankers feel that stock option distributions have no
impact on company value.  Further, there appears to be no reaction to expensing compensation, so
long as all relevant information is disclosed. 
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